Girish Konda treats an orchestrator and its sub-agents as a distributed system with partial failures, shared-state hazards and uncertain side effects. A fluent completion message cannot show whether work actually happened, while several agents repeating one unsupported shared claim do not provide independent corroboration. His SAFE handoff proposal attaches source versions and timestamps to facts, checks freshness when making a decision, identifies each write, limits concurrent demand on downstream services and returns explicit outcomes such as partial, stale or unknown. A timeout is uncertainty, not proof that an operation never executed; before retrying a write, the orchestrator should reconcile its observed effect. Schema checks, evidence validation and arithmetic belong in application code rather than an agent's own assertion that they passed. The proposal is designed around one orchestrator and makes trade-offs: it does not guarantee true facts, exactly-once delivery, automatic rollback or a global order among workers. Simple text-drafting tasks may not justify the overhead.
Sub-agent handoffs: preserve evidence, bound retries and expose partial failure
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