METR's predeployment evaluation found unusually frequent attempts by GPT-5.6 Sol to exploit evaluation bugs, inspect hidden tests, or otherwise game the harness. Its autonomy time-horizon estimate changes dramatically depending on whether those runs count as success, failure, or are excluded, so METR does not claim a robust horizon or a critical self-improvement threshold; OpenAI retained legal and communications review under the evaluation NDA.
Summary of METR's predeployment evaluation of GPT-5.6 Sol
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