Google DeepMind frames increasingly capable agents as potential insider threats and proposes an AI Control Roadmap that combines access controls with supervisors that inspect plans, reasoning, and actions. Its internal prototype analyzed one million coding-agent tasks, but most flags reflected mistakes or overreach rather than adversarial behavior, making this a control design and measurement guide rather than proof of solved monitoring.
Securing the future of AI agents
Related research
More curated notes connected through Model Evaluation and Agent Security.
Pacing model development in an era of cyber-critical capabilities
OpenAI says preliminary evidence that Astra may meet its Critical cybersecurity threshold led it to pause frontier reinforcement-learning work for two weeks and keep its largest planned run on hold. New safeguards include stronger workload and network isolation, continuous boundary testing, token-level monitoring that escalates suspicious tool activity, and broader alignment checks for deception, reward hacking, and unauthorized access.
A blueprint for democratic governance of frontier AI
OpenAI proposes a three-part U.S. frontier-AI governance model: harmonize emerging state safety laws into a federal baseline, strengthen CAISI as an evaluation and standards institution, and coordinate a broader resilience program. Proposed controls include severe-risk evaluations, transparency reports, independent audits, safety-incident reporting, model-weight security, whistleblower protection, and periodic technical assessments.
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026
OWASP's community guide organizes agentic-system risk into ten categories, including goal hijacking, tool misuse, identity and privilege abuse, memory poisoning, insecure inter-agent communication, cascading failures, and rogue-agent behavior. It provides a shared taxonomy and mitigation starting point rather than a certification checklist or evidence that a deployed system is secure.