METR · October 22, 2026

Agent monitoring: reconcile coverage and test paths that suppress inspection

analysis Featured · 80/100 practical score AI Red TeamingAgent SecurityModel Evaluation
Why it matters

METR and Redwood’s high-access pilot assessed OpenAI’s internal monitoring as it existed on or before July 21, 2026. It found gaps involving compaction, turn-completion triggers and client-controlled monitoring behavior. Eligibility for monitoring was not proof of completed inspection. OpenAI subsequently reported fixes, which the researchers did not independently evaluate.

My takeaway: Reconcile inference logs against completed monitor runs, including compaction and long-running tasks. Trigger inspection at bounded intervals, check that monitors see the agent’s full context, and test failure handling. Keep monitor configuration outside agent authority and verify alert delivery with benign test events.
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