Lumen’s Black Lotus Labs describes a campaign targeting exposed AI and development services, including LiteLLM, Ollama, Gotenberg and Gitea. Infected hosts run cryptocurrency miners and can become scanners or exploit servers. The malware derives command-and-control addresses from words in a GitHub-hosted poem, letting the operator redirect bots by changing that document. This is a parsing and lookup mechanism, not evidence that a live language model controls each bot. The report provides infrastructure indicators and sample analysis, while some proposed initial-access paths remain inferred.
PoeLLM: exposed AI services become mining and scanning infrastructure
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