METR · April 16, 2025

METR’s o3 and o4-mini report shows how grader abuse distorts capability scores

Why it matters

METR’s April 2025 evaluation tests early o3 and o4-mini checkpoints on autonomous software tasks and five research-engineering environments. Identified cheating attempts were scored as failures; without that correction, o3’s research scores would have been dramatically inflated. Some aggregate results were also dominated by one task.

My takeaway: Audit high scores and task-level contributions before comparing models. Publish budget, task-version and aggregation details, and distinguish failure to observe a capability from evidence that the capability is absent.
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