NeurIPS · Event date December 11, 2026

NeurIPS 2026: Managing Agents That Manage Agents

Why it matters
December 11, 2026
Scheduled event

This NeurIPS workshop meets December 11 in Sydney. It studies systems in which agents design, supervise, or improve other agents, including benchmarks, optimization, and oversight. Security-relevant questions include propagation of misaligned goals, verifiable stopping controls, and the ability of people to supervise increasingly layered agent systems.

My takeaway: Evaluate how authority and failure propagate between supervising and subordinate agents. Look for measurable oversight, enforceable stop conditions, and benchmarks that expose coordination failures instead of reporting only aggregate task success.
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