OpenAI and Paradigm’s February 2026 EVMbench release evaluates three distinct security capabilities using 117 historical vulnerabilities from 40 audits. Detection is scored against known findings; patching must remove exploitability while retaining functionality; exploitation is evaluated by replaying transactions in isolated local blockchain environments. The setup includes custom graders and checks against grader abuse. The benchmark does not capture all real-world contract security: detection cannot reliably adjudicate novel findings, and exploit grading omits timing-dependent behavior, mainnet state and multichain interactions. Strong exploit scores therefore do not establish equally strong auditing or repair.
EVMbench separates smart-contract detection, patching and exploitation
Related research
More curated notes connected through Model Evaluation and AI Red Teaming.
Pacing model development in an era of cyber-critical capabilities
OpenAI says preliminary evidence that Astra may meet its Critical cybersecurity threshold led it to pause frontier reinforcement-learning work for two weeks and keep its largest planned run on hold. New safeguards include stronger workload and network isolation, continuous boundary testing, token-level monitoring that escalates suspicious tool activity, and broader alignment checks for deception, reward hacking, and unauthorized access.
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026
OWASP's community guide organizes agentic-system risk into ten categories, including goal hijacking, tool misuse, identity and privilege abuse, memory poisoning, insecure inter-agent communication, cascading failures, and rogue-agent behavior. It provides a shared taxonomy and mitigation starting point rather than a certification checklist or evidence that a deployed system is secure.
A blueprint for democratic governance of frontier AI
OpenAI proposes a three-part U.S. frontier-AI governance model: harmonize emerging state safety laws into a federal baseline, strengthen CAISI as an evaluation and standards institution, and coordinate a broader resilience program. Proposed controls include severe-risk evaluations, transparency reports, independent audits, safety-incident reporting, model-weight security, whistleblower protection, and periodic technical assessments.