OpenAI · February 5, 2026

GPT-5.3-Codex system card: separate model behavior from execution controls

Why it matters

This February 2026 system card documents historical evaluations of destructive actions and cyber safeguards alongside sandbox and network controls. OpenAI distinguishes model training from the surrounding execution and monitoring layers, and cautions that challenging evaluation sets do not represent ordinary production error rates. The report is useful as an evaluation-design reference; it is not a description of current product defaults or a guarantee for a new deployment.

My takeaway: Use the destructive-action scenarios to test preservation of user edits, and assess model refusals separately from enforced filesystem and network restrictions. Record the actual model, harness, permissions, and test distribution before comparing results.
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