METR's latest capability report adds harder tasks to an evaluation suite that frontier models had largely outgrown. Its combined TH1.1 and TH2 results imply a time-horizon doubling period of about 3.6 months, but this is a trend over particular tasks, not a universal measure of autonomous work. Most new task thresholds rely on researcher estimates rather than successful human baselines, and measured performance depends on feedback, scaffolding and scoring choices. Models were strong on coding and optimization with clear success signals, while judgment remained weaker when useful feedback was slow or ambiguous. Model judges also overrated evaluation tasks produced by comparably strong or stronger models. METR's capability index did not show a clear acceleration across the overall public frontier; some developer-specific changes were sensitive to methodology. The operational implication is to evaluate agents on representative, difficult-to-verify work and inspect how they earned their scores. Benchmark saturation and weak human comparisons make confident risk conclusions harder, not unnecessary.
METR: stronger research agents expose the limits of capability benchmarks
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