ACM AISec · Event date November 15, 2026

ACM AISec 2026

Why it matters
November 15, 2026
Scheduled event

The 19th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security takes place November 15 alongside ACM CCS in The Hague. It covers adversarial ML, model privacy, AI misuse, foundation-model red teaming, dangerous-capability evaluation, deceptive alignment, multi-agent risk, and autonomous-agent containment; the same workshop day also includes AGENT-SEC, LAMPS, and 3D-Sec.

My takeaway: AISec is a high-value research pipeline because accepted work must state its threat model and is published archivally. Review its program alongside the adjacent agent-security, large-model privacy and safety, and deepfake-security workshops; prioritize papers with released artifacts and adaptive attackers.
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